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Eleventh District Banking Industry 
Weathers Financial Storms
By Kenneth J. Robinson
Eleventh District banks   
were roughly “twice as   
good and half as bad”   
as their counterparts   
across the nation.
In 2009, the banking industry continued to 
feel the fallout from the financial crisis that 
began in mid-2007. Profitability declined 
while asset-quality problems continued to 
mount at banks across the nation and at 
those based in the Eleventh Federal Reserve 
District.1 Some good news was revealed in 
recently available first-quarter data, however, 
which showed profitability rebounding and 
increases in asset-quality problems slowing 
down. Whether measured by profits or prob-
lems, Eleventh District banks were roughly 
“twice as good and half as bad” as their coun-
terparts across the nation. Most likely, this 
reflects the fact that the economic downturn 
was less severe in the district than in other 
parts of the nation.
Another noticeable difference emerges 
when comparing district banks’ recent perfor-
mance with an earlier period when the econ-
omy turned south and the industry suffered 
significant damage—the mid- to late 1980s. 
At that time, students of banking history may 
recall, a sharp decline in oil prices triggered a 
deep regional recession. Bank failures soared, 
and the financial landscape in Texas and other 
parts of the Southwest changed considerably.
This raises the question of why the district’s 
banking industry has been able to weather the 
current downturn—so far—with less damage 
than in the 1980s. The answer likely can be 
found in the changing nature of the district’s 
economic environment since then.
Basic Performance
Bank profitability, as measured by return 
on assets (ROA), continued to decline in 2009 
but rebounded in the first quarter of 2010. 
U.S. banks earned an annualized return of 
0.53 percent in the first quarter, up from 0.08 
percent for all of 2009. Eleventh District banks 
recorded an annualized ROA of 0.91 percent in 
the first quarter, compared with 0.52 percent in 
2009 (Chart 1).
Reflecting the tough economic environ-
ment, almost one-third of all banks nationwide 
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were unprofitable in 2009, while 14 percent 
in the district suffered losses. For the first 
quarter, those numbers improved to 19 per-
cent of banks nationwide and 11 percent of 
district banks that were unprofitable.
The biggest contributor to profitability 
was net interest income, or the difference 
between what banks earn on loans and what 
they pay on deposits. The main factor behind 
banks’ deteriorating performance was a result 
of increased provisions for loan loss reserves. 
This “provision expense” is the amount banks 
set aside out of income to cover estimated 
future loan losses. Increases in provision ex-
pense imply that banks have been attempting 
to build larger cushions to protect themselves 
from loans that go bad. 
Provision expense at U.S. banks rose to 
a record annual high of 2 percent of average 
assets in 2009 but fell back a bit to 1.6 per-
cent (annualized) in first quarter 2010.2 In the 
district, provision expense was 1.2 percent in 
2009 and declined to an annualized 0.72 per-
cent in the first quarter.
As the economy continued to exhibit 
weakness, asset-quality problems mounted, 
mostly in the form of delinquent loans. For 
U.S. banks, the percentage of loans that were 
noncurrent—those with payments 90 days or 
more past-due plus those not accruing inter-
est—increased to slightly more than 5.5 per-
cent in the first quarter, the highest on record. 
The district noncurrent loan rate also rose 
but, at 2.7 percent, was much lower than the 
national figure. 
The composition of loans that were 
noncurrent, though, differed between U.S. 
and Eleventh District banks (Chart 2). At 
banks nationwide, residential real estate 
loans represented the bulk of noncurrent 
loans, followed by commercial real estate 
loans. In the district, commercial real estate 
loans were the dominant source of noncur-
rent loans. A factor in this pattern was dis-
trict banks’ making fewer residential loans 
and more commercial real estate loans than 
their national counterparts. 
According to the Federal Housing  
Finance Agency house price index, Texas’ 
annual housing price appreciation peaked at 
6.3 percent in early 2007, far below the na-
tionwide peak of almost 12 percent in 2005. 
Before the onset of the housing bubble, in 
2000, residential mortgages accounted for 
10 percent of Eleventh District banks’ assets, 
compared with 14.5 percent at U.S. banks. In 
2005, residential mortgages accounted for 9.4 
percent of district banks’ assets, compared 
with 18.2 percent at U.S. banks. The reduced 
proportion of residential mortgages at Elev-
enth District banks could be due to the fact 
that the housing bubble didn’t inflate as 
much in the district. 
At the end of first quarter 2010, the pro-
portion of assets in commercial real estate 
loans was 24 percent at district banks, almost 
double the 13 percent at banks nationwide. 
Within the category, banks report their lend-
ing across three main segments—loans se-
cured by nonfarm nonresidential properties, 
Chart 2
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saw further declines in the reserve coverage 
ratio of noncurrent loans, that is, the cumu-
lative amount of reserves that banks have 
to cover their bad loans relative to the total 
amount of bad loans on their books. 
For U.S. banks the reserve coverage ra-
tio stood at 67 percent at the end of the first 
quarter, down from the year-ago level of 71 
percent, and at Eleventh District banks the 
ratio was 59 percent, down from 82 percent 
a year ago. In other words, banks added 
more and more to their cushions to protect 
them from bad loans and continued to write 
off bad loans; yet, the total amount of loans 
becoming noncurrent increased even faster. 
How do today’s banking troubles com-
pare with past ones? One frequently used 
gauge of overall banking-sector distress is 
the so-called Texas ratio, which attempts to 
assess banks’ ability to withstand losses. It 
measures a bank’s noncurrent loans and re-
possessed real estate as a percentage of loan 
loss reserves and stockholders’ capital, in-
cluding retained earnings but not intangibles 
such as goodwill. A Texas ratio above 100 
percent suggests the potential for troubled 
assets to wipe out a bank’s capital base.
In the 1980s, almost 20 percent of Elev-
enth District banks had a Texas ratio exceed-
ing 100 percent—thus the origin of its name. 
In first quarter 2010, though, 0.6 percent of 
Eleventh District banks were at this danger 
threshold (Chart 4). The percentage of U.S. 
recoveries that have occurred reached an an-
nual record of 2.6 percent of average loans 
last year, while Eleventh District net loan 
charge-offs stood at 1.2 percent.
Banks have set aside a record amount 
of provision expense to try to cover their 
bad loans. Despite increases in both loan 
charge-offs and provision expenses, banks 
loans secured by multifamily residential prop-
erties, and loans for construction and land 
development.
As its name implies, the third loan seg-
ment finances land improvements prior to 
building new structures or the construction 
of industrial, commercial or residential build-
ings. This is generally considered the riskiest 
type of commercial real estate lending and 
has thus been of concern to bank supervi-
sors. In fact, federal regulators issued guide-
lines in 2007 for banks regarding the extent 
of their construction and land development 
lending. The guidance provides a principle-
based discussion of supervisory expecta-
tions for sound risk-management practices 
for banks with loans of this type exceeding 
100 percent of total capital (adjusted for the 
riskiness of their assets and off-balance-sheet 
exposures).3 
At the end of the first quarter, the per-
centage of banks that exceeded the guide-
line varied considerably across the nation. 
The Richmond, Atlanta and San Francisco 
districts were well above the U.S. average of 
17 percent (Chart 3). At 16 percent, the Dal-
las district was slightly below average. How-
ever, the Eleventh District’s noncurrent rate 
for construction and land development loans 
was roughly half that of banks nationwide.
Banks nationwide and in the Eleventh 
District have taken steps to deal with their 
asset-quality problems by writing off bad 
loans. For U.S. banks, charge-offs net of any 
Chart 3
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Chart 4
The Texas Ratio Is not About Texas Anymore
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banks in danger is approaching national lev-
els of the late 1980s, the last period of major 
banking-sector difficulties.
Lending Activity
Declines in profitability and continued 
asset-quality problems make it difficult for 
banks to provide the economy much-needed 
credit. Banks don’t report the amount or 
number of new loans, only the total amount 
of loans outstanding, net of any charge-offs 
and loans paid down or paid off. By this 
measure, lending has been slowing for some 
time at both U.S. and Eleventh District banks 
(Chart 5).
The willingness or ability of banks to 
make loans has likely been affected by the re-
cession that began in December 2007. But the 
demand for bank loans should fall as well. 
In fact, according to the Federal Reserve’s 
“Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank 
Lending Practices,” banks have been reporting 
weak loan demand from both businesses and 
households for several years.4 
It should be stressed, though, that some 
banks are lending. More than half of all U.S. 
community banks—defined here as those 
with assets less than $1 billion—reported in-
creased lending from first quarter 2009 to first 
quarter 2010, while 38 percent of larger banks 
reported increases. The comparable numbers 
were even higher for Eleventh District banks 
(Chart 6).
Increased lending at community banks 
is an encouraging sign, especially for small 
businesses that tend to rely on these institu-
tions for their financing needs.
Banks and the Economy
Whether measured by profitability or 
asset quality, banks based in the Eleventh 
District have been outperforming their coun-
terparts nationwide, even in the midst of 
a deep recession. This leads to the first of 
two interesting questions: Why have district 
banks been doing better?
The most plausible answer is the re-
gional economy’s performance relative to 
the U.S. as a whole. The Eleventh District 
entered the recession later than other parts 
of the country, and its decline in economic 
activity was by some measures less severe. 
For example, since the recession’s start 
in December 2007, Eleventh District employ-
ment has fallen about 2 percent, the smallest 
job-loss rate among all 12 Federal Reserve 
Districts and substantially below the nation’s 
5.3 percent decline. More recently, the Elev-
enth District’s economy has been showing 
signs of improving, along with the overall 
U.S. economy.5
What’s more, the Texas housing market 
hasn’t had the kind of wrenching correction 
experienced elsewhere—for two reasons. 
First, the district’s housing-price apprecia-
tion was relatively muted when compared 
with other parts of the nation. Second, it 
was generally more difficult for Texans to 
use their houses as collateral to leverage up 
their balance sheets. 
Chart 5
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Texas has fairly strict standards con-
cerning mortgage lending. For example, a 
homeowner’s total mortgage debt—the exist-
ing mortgage plus projected home-equity 
loans—can’t exceed 80 percent of the home’s 
current fair-market value. Such restrictions 
provide borrowers and lenders some protec-
tion against declines in property values.
In addition to faring better than the na-
tion, the district’s banking industry also avoid-
ed a repeat of the troubles that accompanied 
the previous banking crisis in the 1980s. 
Those were the worst of times for the 
region’s banks. Declines in oil prices triggered 
two regional recessions, which led to wide-
spread and deep banking-sector difficulties. 
Return on assets fell to a low of –3.5 percent 
in first quarter 1988, and the noncurrent loan 
rate reached an all-time high of 10 percent 
in third quarter 1988, far surpassing U.S. 
banks’ current record of 5.5 percent. Nine of 
Texas’ 10 largest banking organizations failed 
or were acquired, and the casualty rate for 
Eleventh District banks peaked at about 10 
percent in 1989. 
Which prompts the second interesting 
question: Why have Eleventh District banks 
fared better in the current recession than in 
the 1980s downturn?
It’s not likely a simple matter of a 
milder recession. For the Eleventh District, 
the current economic downturn is the worst 
since the mid-1980s.6 During the worst of the 
current recession, from mid-2008 until the 
end of 2009, employment plunged 3.7 per-
cent in the Texas economy, which makes 
up the major part of the Eleventh District. 
During the 1985–87 recession, employment 
fell 3 percent. 
The Texas Business-Cycle Index fell 
almost 4 percent in 2009, compared with a 
2.7 percent decline in 1986. According to 
the Mortgage Bankers Association, the delin-
quency rate—the percentage of mortgages 90 
days or more past due—climbed to almost 4 
percent in Texas at the end of 2009. It rose to 
a high of 2.74 percent at the end of 1987.
One explanation for today’s healthier 
banking industry is the changing nature 
of the regional economy. In the 1980s, the 
Eleventh District was a much less diversified 
economy. For example, oil and gas produc-
tion accounted for almost 20 percent of Texas 
output. By the early 2000s, that share had 
declined to only 6 percent. The move away 
from a heavy reliance on the fortunes of the 
oil and gas industry gave rise to a more var-
ied regional economy and offered the local 
banking industry more opportunities for di-
versification, potentially contributing to lower 
risk profiles.7 
A Closing Caveat
Even though the Eleventh District econo-
my has been showing signs of improvement, 
it should be emphasized that banking-sector 
difficulties may not be behind us. One area of 
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These loans account for almost one-
fourth of district banks’ assets—far exceeding 
the national average of 13 percent and at 
the upper end of exposures across Federal 
Reserve districts. During the 1980s, Eleventh 
District banks’ peak exposure to commercial 
real estate was 16 percent in mid-1986. 
Difficulties in the commercial real estate 
sector in the aftermath of the oil bust con-
tributed appreciably to the deterioration of 
the Eleventh District banking industry in the 
1980s. For example, the office vacancy rate 
in Dallas hit a high of slightly over 28 per-
cent in 1988; in Houston, it peaked at over 
30 percent in 1987. 
If the commercial real estate sector weak-
ens further, the performance of Eleventh Dis-
trict banks can be expected to decline—both 
in absolute terms and relative to banks na-
tionwide. The article titled “Cloud Over Com-
mercial Real Estate Is Slowly Lifting in Texas,” 
on page 10 in this issue of Southwest Economy, 
investigates the current state and likely pros-
pects for the commercial real estate sector.
Robinson is a research officer in the Financial  
Industry Studies Department at the Federal  
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Notes
1 The Eleventh Federal Reserve District consists of all of Texas, 
the northern portion of Louisiana and the southern portion of 
New Mexico. Data for the Eleventh District banking industry have 
been adjusted for structural changes involving recent relocations 
of banks into the district.
2 Consistent data for the banking industry are generally available 
beginning in 1984. In this article, records are relative to that date.
3 There are other components to the guidance as well. See SR 
Letter 07-1, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Jan. 4, 2007, 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2007/SR0701.htm.
4 “Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending 
Practices,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, April 2010, www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
SnLoanSurvey/201005/default.htm.
5 See “Texas Economy Shakes Off Rough Ride in 2009,” by 
Laila Assanie and Pia Orrenius, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Southwest Economy, First Quarter, 2010.
6 See note 5.
7 See “The Effect of High Oil Prices on Today’s Texas Economy,” 
by Stephen P.A. Brown and Mine K. Yücel, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas Southwest Economy, no. 5, 2004. Regulatory 
changes in the banking industry could also have played a role. 
The Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act of 1994 allowed banks to set up branches across state lines, 
which was generally forbidden in the 1980s. These changes 
provided banks, especially larger organizations, with even more 
opportunities for diversification and concomitant declines in risk.